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I n the early 1860s Gladstone attempted to revolutionize British wine con-sumption by making substantial cuts to duties and creating new outlets
for retail sale. Although imports almost tripled between the late 1850s and
the mid-1870s, this proved not to be a permanent change in drinking
habits, as wine consumption then declined for the rest of the century. On
the eve of the First World War wine imports were higher than they had been
a century earlier, but per caput annual consumption at a bottle and a half
remained as it had been in 1815, and was half the level of the early
1870s. Therefore if a combination of falling production costs and falling
transport costs encouraged a major increase in the consumption of a wide
variety of foods and beverages in nineteenth-century Britain, this happened
only briefly with wine. Why this was the case is an important question,
because Britain’s growing, and comparatively wealthy, urban population
might have provided an important market for producers in southern Eur-
ope. For example, if the British had consumed just one-tenth of the French
figure in the 1890s, this would have created a demand for wine equivalent
to 18 per cent of Spain’s total output, or 14 per cent of Italy’s, or 105 per
cent of Portugal’s.2 As it was, the city of Paris consumed about seven times
as much wine as the whole of the United Kingdom.3 This failure to main-
tain export markets for products such as wine was a major cause of the low
productivity found in agriculture in southern Europe, and contributed
indirectly to the low living standards of the region.
The eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries saw considerable inno-
vation in grape and wine production in various parts of Europe, permitting
a number of distinctive wines, such as madeira, port, sherry, claret, and
champagne to be marketed. Merchants in the centres of production, very
often British or of British descent, played a key role in this process, although
1 Earlier versions of this article were presented at the London School of Economics; in Birming-
ham (at the Economic History Society conference, 2002); at Universidad Pablo de Olavide
(Sevilla); at Universidad de Zaragoza; and in Paris (at the Colloque, Nomenclatures et Classifications,
2003). I thank participants for their helpful comments, and am also grateful for those of the refer-
ees. In addition Antonio Miguel Bernal, Albert Carreras, Jean-Michel Chevet, Paul Duguid, Nicho-
las Faith, Marta Macias, Enrique Monta~ne´s, Vicente Pinilla, and Leandro Prados de la Escosura
made useful suggestions. Eileen Power made considerable improvements to the style. Financial
assistance was provided by the Spanish government (Grant PB-0033 and BEC2003-06481).
2 Average French consumption calculated by adding imports to production and subtracting
exports was 45.9 million hectolitres between 1891 and 1900: Direction Ge´ne´rale, Annuaire statistique,
p. 177.
3 W. & A. Gilbey, letter to The Times, 14 Oct. 1891, p. 14.
high import duties caused wine to remain a luxury in the home market. The
legislative changes of the early 1860s, together with the more general
changes taking place in retailing at this time, such as the wider use of
brands, heavy advertising, high sales volumes, and low unit prices presented
new possibilities for selling wine. This article argues that the failure to cre-
ate a mass market for wine was caused by the interaction of two factors:
volatility of supply and the difficulties in establishing impersonal exchange
mechanisms in place of those based on the personal reputation of economic
agents such as wine merchants. Because Britain was a single market sup-
plied mainly by four different wine-producing regions in Europe, it is an ap-
propriate source to show why some commodity chains were more flexible
than others. Contemporaries frequently maintained that consumers
switched between different types of wines because of changes in taste and
fashion, but this article will argue that the changes can be explained, at least
in part, by the degree of success that producers and merchants had in over-
coming marketing problems. Consumers often received insufficient infor-
mation to judge the quality of a wine before buying it, and the high price
of some wines encouraged cheap imitations, some of which were so bad
as to be prejudicial to the health of the drinker.
The article is divided into six sections. The first looks at changes in wine
consumption over the nineteenth century, and traces the fortunes of differ-
ent types of wines. The next section considers the nature of supply volatility
and the response by merchants. Because geography placed strict limits to
the supply of a particular wine, sudden increases in demand or prolonged
shortages caused by vine disease encouraged merchants to purchase wines
from other regions. Unless consumers could easily identify product quality
prior to purchase, there was a risk that this strategy would damage the mar-
ket once normal supplies resumed. Section III considers the response of
producers of fortified wines (port and sherry) and section IV extends this
investigation to French wines (claret and champagne). It is argued that
some commodity chains were more successful than others in providing con-
sumers with accurate information on wine quality. Section V considers the
problems associated with the retailing of wines in the United Kingdom and
investigates why, unlike some other imported foods and beverages in this
period, the commodity chain remained ‘production’, rather than ‘market’,
led. The final section provides some conclusions.
I
In early nineteenth-century Britain, wine was considered a luxury product
and price was less important in determining demand than other factors,
such as changes in fashion and taste. Therefore, despite a rapidly growing
population, rising real incomes, and a reduction in import duties of about
34 per cent, aggregate consumption increased by only 16 per cent between
1799=1824 and 1825=51, and annual per caput consumption fell from
almost three bottles at the end of the eighteenth century to half that figure
in the early 1850s.4 The reduction to 5s. 9d. per gallon in 1840 still left
duties equivalent to the import price of ‘good’ sherry, twice that of ‘tavern’
sherry, and five times that of ordinary table wines.5 In the debate on duty
reform in the 1850s, George Porter, the author of The progress of nations, ar-
gued that only a major reduction in duties would increase consumption suf-
ficiently to maintain the Exchequer’s revenue, ‘not so much by inducing
persons who are at present consumers of wine to take more of it, as by
enlarging the circle into which it would be introduced’.6
When Gladstone brought in new legislation in the early 1860s as part of
the Cobden-Chevalier Treaty, his aim was to change radically the nature of
wine drinking in Britain. By 1862, duties on wines with an alcoholic
strength of under 26 proof (equivalent to 14.8 Gay-Lussac) had been
cut from 5s. 9d. a gallon to 1s., with stronger ones paying 2s. 6d.7 For for-
tified wines, such as sherry or port, this was a reduction of 57 per cent; for
unfortified wines, the cheapest of which could now retail for under 1s. a
bottle, the reduction was 83 per cent. The new legislation also introduced
major changes in the retailing of wines. This was especially true of the
‘Single Bottle Act’ of 1861, which allowed retailers, on the payment of a
relatively small licence fee, to sell wine for consumption ‘off’ their prem-
ises.8 These changes led to a rapid growth in consumption, with total wine
imports increasing from 32.5 million litres in 1856=60 to 78 million in
1871=5 (table 1). Some countries benefited more than others. Imports of
French wines, which were rarely fortified and therefore paid the lower duty,
grew six-fold, and market share jumped from 8 per cent in the early 1850s
to 40 per cent by the early 1880s.9 By contrast, fortifying with alcohol was
an integral part of the production of sherry and port, and other wines from
the Iberian peninsula were also strengthened so that they would keep.10
Wine imports from Portugal grew by only two-thirds between 1856=60
and 1871=5, and market share fell from 30 to 20 per cent. By contrast,
Spanish imports increased one and a half times, with market share remain-
ing roughly constant at 40 per cent.
4 Calculated from Tennent, Wine, pp. 28, 36.
5 Dover, in S. C. on Import Duties (P.P. 1852, XVII), p. 653. The duty was equivalent to approxi-
mately 35%, 46%, and 56% of the retail price.
6 Porter, in ibid., pp. 498, 511.
7 Rates changed in both 1860 and 1861. Those introduced in 1862 lasted until 1886, when the lower
rates were extended to wines of up to 30 proof. In 1899 the duty was increased to 1s. 3d. for wines of
less than 30, and 3s. for those above that level. For sparkling wines an additional duty was imposed in
1888 of 2s. 6d. per imperial gallon, or 1s. 3d. if the value of the wine did not exceed 15s. This was
reduced to 2s. irrespective of value in 1893 and raised to 2s. 6d. from 1899. Finally, ordinary bottled
wines paid an additional 1s. per gallon after 1899.
8 The licence fee was between £2 10s. and £10, depending on the value of the premises. By 1880,
3,895 licences had been granted to sell wine. Wine dealers, who could not sell wine in quantities of less
than 2 gallons (12 bottles), paid £5 5s.: Wilson, Alcohol and the nation, pp. 322-3 and tab 25. See also
Briggs, Wine for sale, p. 37.
9 For example in 1875, 95% of Spanish wines and 98% of Portuguese paid 2s. 6d. a gallon, and 96%
of French wines paid the lower rate of 1s.: S. C. on Wine Duties (P.P. 1878-9, XIV), pp. 315-17.
10 Ibid., pp. 118-19.
The level of wine consumption was not maintained, however, but fell by
30 per cent between 1871=5 and 1909=13 to just over half a million hecto-
litres on the eve of the Great War, a figure equivalent to little more than
1 per cent of French output. Per caput consumption, which had reached
about three bottles in 1873 and 1876, had halved by 1909=13.11 The
decline in per caput consumption from the 1870s cannot be explained by
a switch to other alcoholic beverages, as the movements in demand both
for spirits and for beer were similar to that for wine (figure 1). There are
a number of possible explanations for the fall in alcohol consumption in this
period, including the growing supply of alternative consumer goods that
encouraged a diversification in household expenditure, and the influence
of the Temperance movement.12 However, these arguments cannot explain
why consumers did not switch from spirits or beer to wine. More important
here, neither can they explain the changes in the types of wine being drunk
over the period. Sherry (figure 2), claret (figure 3), and champagne
(figure 4) all saw rapid increases in consumption at one moment or other,
but then experienced a decline. For sherry, this decline can be dated from
the early 1870s, for quality claret from the early 1880s, for ordinary claret
Table 1. Wines retained for home consumption in the United Kingdom
% of wines retained
Date Total (m. litres) France Portugal Spain Others
1816-1820 21.85 3.8 55.2 19.2 21.8
1821-1825 24.71 4.5 51.2 22.3 22.0
1826-1830 29.72 5.4 45.6 29.6 19.4
1831-1835 28.44 4.0 43.1 34.9 18.0
1836-1840 30.67 5.7 41.3 36.3 16.7
1841-1845 27.86 6.4 38.4 39.2 16.0
1846-1850 28.74 5.8 40.9 39.0 14.3
1851-1855 30.58 7.7 37.7 39.8 14.8
1856-1860 32.47 10.2 29.6 39.8 20.4
1861-1865 49.62 20.1 24.6 41.7 13.6
1866-1870 65.66 27.2 20.0 41.7 11.0
1871-1875 77.97 29.2 20.4 39.9 10.5
1876-1880 75.78 37.5 19.4 33.4 9.6
1881-1885 65.81 40.3 19.5 29.7 10.6
1886-1890 63.28 39.3 22.7 25.8 12.2
1891-1895 65.56 38.7 23.8 23.1 14.4
1896-1900 73.52 37.1 22.5 23.8 16.6
1901-1905 62.28 32.7 23.3 24.6 19.4
1906-1910 54.71 30.9 25.6 23.6 19.9
1911-1916 49.85 24.7 29.7 25.7 19.9
Source: Wilson, Alcohol and the nation, tab. 12
11 From 0.56 to 0.26 gallons: Wilson, Alcohol and the nation, pp. 332-3.
12 Gourvish and Wilson, British brewing industry, ch. 2. Before 1900 the slight decline in per caput
consumption of beer and spirits was compensated by the growth in population and exports, leading
one historian to claim that, in the nineteenth century, ‘temperance had promised much and delivered
little’: Weir, ‘Obsessed with moderation’, p. 96.
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Figure 1. Alcohol consumption per head, 1815-1914
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Source: Wilson, Alcohol and the nation, pp. 331-3
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Figure 2. Imports of sherry and Spanish wine, 1850-1905
Source: Wilson; Alcohol and the nation, pp. 362-3; Ridley’s, various years
from the late 1880s, and for champagne from about 1900. Although port
wine avoided the sharp downturn in imports prior to the First World
War, it also experienced fluctuations in demand over the century (figure
5). Before looking more closely at these different wines, it is necessary to
consider briefly the supply side, and especially the importance of vine dis-
eases in the nineteenth century.
0
50
100
150
200
250
18
25
18
35
18
45
18
55
18
65
18
75
18
85
18
95
19
05
H
ec
to
lit
re
s 
(’
00
0)
Date
barrels
bottles
Figure 3. Wine exports from Bordeaux to Britain, 1825-1911
Source: Tableau Ge´ne´ral du Commerce
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Figure 4. Exports of champagne to Britain, 1831-1911
Source: Tableau Ge´ne´ral du Commerce
II
Wine was, and remains, a difficult product to sell. Most wines were made
from a variety of grapes, and blending of wines from different regions
was common.13 As noted above, some wines also required spirits to be
added before shipping. Further mixing and strengthening in England was
considered by many to be both a legitimate and a necessary part of the
trade.14 However, the problems of marketing in the nineteenth century
were caused not just by the heterogeneous nature of wine, but also by sup-
ply volatility. Casson has suggested three types of volatility, which organiza-
tional structures have to overcome.15 In the first instance, important
structural changes in the market could create new opportunities to trade.
Gladstone’s fiscal and legal innovations of 1860-2 created conditions which
significantly increased the size of the potential market for wine both by
reducing duties and by creating new marketing channels for its sale. These
changes, together with improvements in transport, also reduced entry costs
for new regions to trade with the United Kingdom. A second type of vola-
tility concerns the fluctuations in supply and demand within established
markets caused, for example, by a harvest failure in Bordeaux, or a business
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Figure 5. Port wine imports to the United Kingdom, 1814-1910
Source: Wilson; Alcohol and the nation, pp. 362-3
13 Even quality clarets for the English market in the early nineteenth century were blended with wines
from Hermitage or Benicarlo (Spain).
14 The Safe Food and Drugs Act of 1875 required clear labelling of contents, but permitted the mix-
ing of wines, although not with ingredients ‘injurious’ to the health. The major problem appears to have
been the addition of potato spirit, which contained fusel oil: S. C. on Adulteration of Food Act (P.P. 1874,
VI), p. 207. For the 1875 act, see especially French and Phillips, Cheated not poisoned?.
15 Casson, Information and organization, pp. 10-11.
depression in the manufacturing districts of northern England. Although
the timing of these events cannot be predicted accurately, they are not
entirely unexpected and short-term movements in prices are usually
sufficient to balance supply with demand again. However, an additional
problem with wine is that quality also changes with each vintage, increasing
the problem of classification along the commodity chain.
Finally, Casson suggests a third type of volatility, which is associated with
‘breakdowns and interruption of supply that disrupt the equilibrium flow’. 16
In the nineteenth century there were a number of important breakdowns in
the supply of wine, which lasted several years. These were caused by new
diseases brought from North America, a negative consequence of the faster
voyage times in the Atlantic economy. The first was oidium or powdery
mildew, which both reduced harvests and wine quality, especially between
1853 and 1856, and caused prices to soar briefly.17 Phylloxera, a disease that
in time required the replanting of virtually all of Europe’s vineyards,
followed.18 Especially relevant here is what happened in France, where pro-
duction slumped from an average of 58 million hectolitres a year in 1871=5
to 26 million in 1886=90, and average prices rose by one-third between the
early 1870s and the early 1880s, before declining once more in the face of
massive imports and a recovery in domestic production (figure 6).19 Per
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Figure 6. French wine prices, 1840-1913
Sources: Pech, Entreprise viticole, pp. 511-12; Annuaire Statistique, 1934, pp. 62-3
16 Ibid., p. 11.
17 The solution to oidium was to dust the vines with sulphur.
18 Although the disease was identified in France in the 1860s, many of Europe’s vineyards were not
infected until the twentieth century. See especially Ordish, Wine blight and Pouget, Histoire de la lutte.
19 Direction Ge´ne´rale, Annuaire statistique, p. 63.
caput consumption in Britain therefore started to decline at the same time as
domestic supplies were falling fast in France. Although there were various
ways of treating phylloxera, such as the frequent flooding of vineyards or
injecting the soil with sulphocarbonates or carbon disulphide, these were
too expensive for most producers. The only effective long-term cure was to
plant phylloxera-immune American vines, which were then grafted with Eur-
opean scions. The third disease was downy mildew whose appearance in the
1880s not only reduced the size of harvests, but more importantly ruined the
quality. Once a solution was found to downy mildew (treatment with ‘Bor-
deaux mixture’), the attacks from this disease and from oidium became lim-
ited to those years when growers were unable to take preventive measures.
The wine trade in producer countries responded to these supply disrup-
tions in two different ways: by allowing the shortage of good-quality wine to
increase prices, or by reducing quality with the use of cheaper, inferior
wines from other regions to compensate for the smaller local harvests.
For example, oidium caused the price of high-quality mature sherries to tri-
ple in Britain between 1850=3 and 1860=3, but lower import duties and the
ability of shippers to export wines from other regions as ‘sherry’ actually led
to a fall in prices for the cheapest wines.20 In fact, London prices for a wide
range of ordinary wines from Iberia stagnated over several decades, despite
significant fluctuations in both the size and quality of the vintages, and the
tendency for wine prices in producer countries to increase from the late
1870s (figure 7). The same was true of cheap claret. Ridley & Co.’s Wine
and Spirit Trade Circular, a leading trade journal for the British market,
noted that in Bordeaux a consequence of the significant decrease in harvest
size caused by phylloxera was that:
no pure Claret can now be put on board under £8, and then of less satisfactory qual
ity than was a few years since easily obtainable at £5; whilst blends with Spanish Red,
South of France, and other Wines are sold, occasionally under their true designation,
but generally under the usurped title of ‘Claret’, at from £5 to £7 per hhd.21
Therefore although shippers supplied cheap wines at stable prices, the
quality often varied considerably, making the need for consumer infor-
mation crucial, not just for the expensive ‘fine’ wines, but also for cheap
wines. There are two major factors to consider when determining a wine’s
quality, namely its ‘growth’ and the ‘vintage’. Growth can be defined as the
natural environment of a vineyard (the terroir) and the technology and skills
used in the production of the wine. This information could then be shown
by using the name (brand) of the grower and=or the shipper. Adding the
year of production (vintage) provided information on the annual changes
in quality. Price differences for wines from vineyards found in a relatively
20 Shaw, Wine, p. 235; Simpson, Too little regulation?
21 Nov. 1891, p. 627. Published under a number of slightly different titles from 1848, Ridley’s was
often critical of the manipulation of wine by foreign producers, but more tolerant of the same practice
when undertaken by British merchants: Ridley’s, Jan. 1881, p. 5. A hogshead (hhd.) was equivalent to
between 220 and 225 litres.
small geographical area could be significant. Thus in Bordeaux’s Haut
Me´doc, red wine in a particular year could range from 300 francs per tun
(900 litres) for a paysan growth, to 5,000 francs for the first-class growths.22
Of perhaps even greater importance for the wine market was the fact that
after a good vintage, the wine of a less well-known grower might sell for
more than the price of a top chaˆteau after a poor one.23
Price differences of these magnitudes created strong incentives for indi-
viduals along the commodity chain to benefit from the problems of
incomplete information. The situation was further complicated in the
1870s and 1880s by the general shortage of wines and by high prices.
There was also the potential risk that a serious decline in a wine’s quality,
or consumers’ concern about the widespread sale of adulterated imita-
tions, might threaten the reputation not just of the cheaper wines, but also
of the quality ones. As Akerlof has argued, asymmetries of information
where the buyer has insufficient knowledge of the quality of a product
prior to purchase can lead to a situation whereby bad goods drive out
the good.24 The next two sections consider how producers in some
Figure 7. Prices of cheap Iberian wines, 1869-1894
Source: Ridley’s, various years
22 Cocks and Feret, Bordeaux et ses vins, 8th edn., p. 89. Likewise Gonzalez Byass sold sherry at prices
ranging between £18 and £150 per butt (500 litres) in 1878: Monta~ne´s, Gonzalez Byass, p. 264.
23 For example wines from the leading growers (premier crus) in 1853 sold for less than some of the
crus paysans of 1854: Markham, 1855, p. 369.
24 Akerlof, ‘Market for ‘‘lemons’’ ’.
regions were more successful than others in avoiding these problems.
Given the difficulties in achieving voluntary agreements among economic
agents to control wine quality at the source of production, a number of
private strategies, such as the development of brand names or the pro-
duction of ‘vintage’ wines were devised to provide information to consu-
mers, with varying degrees of success.
III
The fact that sherry and port accounted for approximately three-quarters
of all British imports of wine before 1860 implied that the potential new
wine-drinking public were already aware of these names, although the
commercial structure for their sale was that of quality wines. As fortified
wines, they also had the advantage over unfortified wines in that they
kept longer once the bottle was open. Total sherry exports rose from
about 15 million litres a year in the 1850s to almost 40 million in the
early 1870s.25 However, by the early 1890s the figure had fallen to less
than 20 million litres, and imports to the United Kingdom were less
than a quarter of what they had been at their peak (figure 2). Contem-
poraries argued that this fall was caused by a decline in the drink’s
‘reputation’, the result of the sale as ‘sherry’ of large quantities of
poor-quality wines, some of which were prejudicial to the drinker’s
health.26 However, a similar combination of high prices and widespread
adulteration had led to a decline in the imports of port from the
mid-1830s to the early 1850s, but these then recovered (figure 5), in
sharp contrast to sherry. The next point to consider is the attempts by
producers to classify their wine for consumers, and then the question
of the supply of cheap wines and adulteration.
Both in Jerez and in Porto, trade was dominated by a small number of
shippers who sold wine under their own ‘brand’, thereby assuming
responsibility for its quality. One major difference between the two drinks
was that by the 1860s the leading merchants had perfected the production
of vintage port, which was made only after a good harvest. This did not
imply that high-income consumers could dispense with their local wine
merchant, who often matured and bottled the wine, but it did provide in-
formation, which was relevant for establishing a national market. Because
the decision to classify a harvest as vintage rested with the port shipper
alone, the selling of poor-quality wine as ‘vintage’ would damage his repu-
tation. As this reputation had often been built up over many decades, short-
term opportunistic behaviour was usually discouraged.27 By contrast,
sherry was a blended wine made from many different harvests, and created
25 Sherry was produced in Jerez de la Frontera, Sanlucar, and Puerto de Santa Marı´a in the Cadiz Bay
region.
26 Shaw, Wine, p. 217. This section is based on Simpson, Too little regulation?
27 Sellers, Oporto, gives a history of the major port houses.
using the solera.28 A few vintage wines were produced, but it was generally
believed that sherry remained fresher in casks than in bottles, and the solera
system had the advantage of reducing considerably the time it took to
mature the wine. The solera therefore made it easier for exporters to
produce a standardized product and dispose of wines from the poor
vintages, but it provided less information for consumers. Sherry was
frequently sold using the brand name of the shipper, and quality identified
by numbers or marks rather than by the year. The system was often confus-
ing, as Ridley’s noted in 1892:
The public knows so much of vintages and growths of Champagnes, Ports, Clarets,
and to a lesser extent of Burgundies and Hocks. . . . With Sherry the case is very dif
ferent. And the consumer knows nothing but vague names as Vino de Pasto, Amon
tillado, Oloroso, etc; the result is that he has less means of judging what price he
ought to pay.29
As a result, as Duguid has argued, it was often the local wine merchants
who established their own brand.30 Of these, the most famous was perhaps
Harvey’s Bristol Cream, which dates from the early 1860s, although the
shipper Gonzalez Byass also started selling Tio Pepe in the 1870s.31 Both
of these were expensive wines, and unsuitable for the development of a
mass market. However, if the poor classification of sherries provided custo-
mers, especially new ones, with limited information on quality, the major
factor behind the decline in sales was the concern of consumers regarding
the potential health risks associated with the drink.
Sherry was an expensive drink on account of the high cost of land and
labour and the low yields, so to meet the demand for cheap white wines
after 1860, Jerez’s shippers turned to other regions in central and south-
ern Spain. To reduce costs, these wines were often exported shortly after
the harvest, and were heavily fortified to stop them turning sour. The suc-
cess of sherry encouraged producers in other countries to sell their own
‘sherry’. Of particular concern to the health authorities in Britain were
the ‘manufactured’ wines, the most notorious perhaps being ‘Hamburg
sherry’, which was made by adding spirits, saccharine, and other sub-
stances to ‘a light German wine of poor quality’.32 When the lower level
of duty was extended from 26 to 30 proof after 1886, it was widely
reported that chemicals were being added to stabilize cheap Spanish white
28 The solera consists of a series of barrels of similar types of sherry, at different levels of development.
When wine is withdrawn for sale from the oldest, it is refilled by wine from the next, and so on along the
solera. If only small quantities are removed, then the new wines that have been introduced quickly
assume the quality of the old ones.
29 Ridley’s, March 1892, p. 165.
30 Duguid, ‘Developing the brand’, p. 26.
31 For this early date of Harvey’s Bristol Cream, see Simpson, Too little regulation? and for Tio Pepe,
Monta~ne´s, Gonzalez Byass.
32 Medical Times and Gazette, quoted in Tovey, Wine revelations.
wines so that they could be imported at the lower duty.33 Although this
continual and widespread bad publicity made many in Britain believe that
‘lemons’ had ruined the market for the good wines, it cannot be the only
explanation. In particular, the claim made by Dr Thudichum in 1873
regarding the supposed health risks associated with the use of gypsum when
crushing the grapes, and sulphur in the fumigation of the casks, applied to all
sherries, not just the cheap ones. It was widely debated in both the national
and local press, and it was not until some 20 years later that the Lancet
published a report showing that these practices were perfectly safe.34
The export of adulterated cheap wines from Portugal appears to have
been less expensive.35 Yet the demand from Britain for cheap port was just
as great as that for cheap sherry, although ‘good young port’ sold for more
than either ‘common sherry’ or ‘sound Cadiz white wine’ (figure 7). In the
late nineteenth century, the price of port was often made more competitive,
especially in public houses, by mixing it with cheap Spanish red wines from
Tarragona.36 Tarragona red sold at half the price of the cheapest port, and
the mixing was done by retail wine merchants or publicans, most of whom
had personal contact with consumers. Therefore the problem that those
involved in the sherry trade failed to solve was not so much that different
wines were being mixed and sold as sherry, but rather that their classi-
fication was poor, and there were rumours concerning the supposed health
risks. Although the quantities of adulterated sherries may have been rela-
tively small, and the quality of ‘good’ sherry by the 1880s had perhaps
improved significantly from the levels of the 1860s, demand failed to
recover. The situation may suggest that the control of product quality for
cheaper wines was best left in the hands of retailers in the United Kingdom,
rather than producers in Jerez or Porto. However, before considering this
possibility, it is necessary to look first at the experience of two unfortified
wines, namely claret and champagne.
IV
In theory at least, the Bordeaux wine trade appears to have been in a
strong position to avoid the problems encountered by the sherry trade in
establishing and maintaining product reputation. For quality claret, the
33 Simpson, Too little regulation?. By 1900, 81% of Spanish imports paid 1s. a gallon (compared with
just 8% of Portugal’s), but by this date only 37% of imports of Spanish wines were white.
34 See Jeffs, Sherry, pp. 95-8.
35 ‘The one saving feature, as compared with the trade in cheap so-called Sherry, is that shippers of
respectable standing at Oporto have not yet condescended, like the leading Xerez and Port St. Mary
houses, to traffic in such dangerous commodities, and as the bulk of the trade must always remain in
their hands, the evil will not, we hope, be extended beyond its present limit’. Ridley’s, Jan. 1887, p. 2.
36 S.C. on Wine Duties (P.P. 1878-9, XIV), p. 103. By 1896 the United Kingdom was importing more
Spanish red than white. When imports from Spain started to decline after 1900 because of problems of
quality, Australian wines were used.
classification of the leading growers in 1855 provided a sufficiently accurate
guide that has allowed it to remain virtually unchanged to this day.37 For
the cheaper wines, well-established export houses were able to draw on
the produce of a much larger and highly diverse wine district covering
almost 200,000 hectares in 1873.38 Yet exports from Bordeaux to the Uni-
ted Kingdom, both of quality bottled claret and of ordinary table wines, fol-
lowed a similar trend, rising rapidly from the 1860s and then declining
equally quickly from the 1880s (figure 3). On the eve of the First World
War the United Kingdom imported little more wine from Bordeaux than
it had done prior to the early 1860s.
In 1816 Andre´ Jullien published the first classification of Bordeaux’s lead-
ing vineyards in his Topographie de tous les vignobles connus, which listed five
distinctive classes, although specific properties were found in only the first
two.39 Other lists soon followed, published both in French and in Eng-
lish.40 However, it was the Bordeaux Classification of 1855, compiled by
the brokers (courtiers) for the Universal Exhibition of that year, that became
the reference for the wine trade and consumers alike. This listed 61 of the
Me´doc’s vineyards and one from the Graves region (Chaˆteau Haut-Brion)
in a five-class classification of red wines. Its success stemmed from three
factors. First, rather than being a subjective study based on taste, it used
prices that had been paid for different wines over many years. Second, it
was the relatively impartial brokers, and not the growers, who compiled
it. Finally, wine merchants considered it as only a rough guide, and were
quite willing to pay higher or lower prices when they thought a wine war-
ranted it. This was important, because the quality of a chaˆteau’s wine varied
not only according to the vintage, but also over time on account of changes
in the level of investment and the quality of management skills.41
However, the 1855 classification ignored the great majority of vineyards
in the region. As these produced many good wines, the increasing popu-
larity of claret encouraged growers to establish their own brand names by
adopting an impressive name for their vineyard. The leading wine guide
to the region, Cocks and Feret’s Bordeaux et ses vins, listed only 318
chaˆteaux in its 1868 edition, but the number increased to 800 in 1881,
and to 1,600 in 1900.42 Previously obscure vineyards, which perhaps had
37 Chaˆteau Mouton-Rothschild was promoted to a First Growth in 1973. The 1855 classification also
included a two-class classification of white wines.
38 This was significantly more than it had been earlier in the century. Franck in 1824, for example,
gives only 130,000 hectares: Traite´ sur les vins, cited in Roudie´, Vignobles et vignerons, p. 31.
39 Jullien, Topographie. Some of the brokers (courtiers) had their own private lists in the eighteenth
century. For a history of the classification of Bordeaux wines, see Markham, 1855.
40 For example, in French, Franck, Traite´ sur les vins (1824), Le guide (1825), Paguierre, Classification
(1829) and Cocks, Bordeaux (1850); and in English, Jullien, Topography (1824), Henderson, History
(1824), Paguierre, Classification (1828), Redding, Modern wine (1833), and Cocks, Bordeaux (1846).
41 Only Chaˆteau Mouton-Rothschild and Chaˆteau Le´oville-Barton have remained with the same
family since 1855: Robinson, ed., Oxford companion, p. 245.
42 See Roudie´, Vignobles et vignerons, p. 142.
produced excellent wine to sell under a shipper’s name, now gained an
identity for themselves.
Having established a recognizable brand name, growers had to protect
it. To prevent merchants from mixing their wines with others, estate bot-
tling was introduced by some producers, and with it the use of distinc-
tive labels and branded corks. British wholesale merchants criticized the
trend towards chaˆteau bottling, claiming that it was ‘a guarantee of ori-
gin, not of quality’,43 but also realized that, as happened with cham-
pagne, its widespread use would give the producers a greater control
of the market and a greater share of the profits at the expense of the
merchants.
The experiment in chaˆteau bottling was only temporary, however, not
because the concept was flawed, but as a result of the breakdown in the
supply of quality wines. The appearance of downy mildew significantly
reduced harvests in the Bordeaux region between 1882 and 1886,
but—more importantly—ruined their quality. After the harvest of 1884,
Chaˆteau Lafite sold its wine for £14 per hogshead, with ‘the right to
bottle at the Chaˆteau with the brand and label’.44 Unfortunately, only
after part of the consignment had been sold by the shipper several years
later was it discovered that the wine had turned bad. Following the legal
dispute over who was responsible, together with the bad publicity
generated, chaˆteau bottling lost its popularity until the 1920s.
The potential threat caused to growers by phylloxera was even greater.
Not only would they have to replant the dead vines, but there was a fear
that the immune American root-stock used as a replacement would reduce
the quality of the leading wines. Producers of quality wines therefore
resorted to the heavy use of chemicals and fertilizers and the flooding of
vineyards in a successful, but expensive, attempt to delay the spread of
the disease. Therefore, while the smaller vineyards of the Gironde, whose
owners could not afford such measures, were being devastated by
phylloxera, the leading producers of red wine in the Me´doc actually
increased output.45 Ironically, these successful attempts to delay phylloxera
resulted in a decline in quality—precisely what the producers had been
attempting to avoid. Chaˆteau Margaux’s output, for example, reportedly
increased from 450 hogsheads of ‘premier wine’ in the early 1880s to
between 1,200 and 1,400 hogsheads of ‘indifferent’ or ‘bad’-quality wine
in 1903.46
43 Army & Navy Co-operative Society, cited in Ridley’s, 12 June 1889, p. 298.
44 Ridley’s, Jan. 1887, p. 35.
45 Taking 1864=78 as 100, the output for the whole of the Gironde fell to 78 in 1888=97, but that of
the Grand crus of the Me´doc increased to 121: Lafforgue, ‘Cent cinquante ans’, p. 301; Pijassou,
Le Me´doc, pp. 776-7. Chaˆteau Latour, for example, increased output by 252% between 1879=87 and
1898=1907: Higounet, ed., Chateau Latour, p. 297.
46 Ridley’s, April 1903, p. 675.
The abundant supplies of not very good wine from the top growers
encouraged retail merchants to exploit the brand names that had been
created by the 1855 Classification. Thus it was argued that:
The Public, who unfortunately know more about Growths, than Vintages, receive
Circulars offering Chaˆteau this or Chaˆteau that at apparently extremely low rates,
and on the strength of the name, purchase Wines, which can but prove intensely dis
appointing. They then are apt to argue that, if wines bearing the names of the best
estates of the Me´doc be so inferior, those of lower grade must be bad indeed. Thus
their faith in Claret, instead of in the merchant, who has sold it them, is shaken, and
an inducement is at hand to try Wine from some other districts.47
Demand in Britain for quality claret fell significantly and if this was some-
times explained by the growing popularity of smoking and drinking coffee
instead of drinking fine claret after dinner, the absence of good vintages
from the early 1880s and the decline in the reputation of the leading brands
were contributing factors.48 The apparent shift in market control back-
wards along the supply chain from the Bordeaux merchants (ne´gociants)
to the producers in the three decades following the 1855 Classification
and the introduction of chaˆteau bottling, was perhaps more illusionary than
real. Virtually all wines, even those of the leading chaˆteaux, were purchased
by the ne´gociants shortly after the harvest, and matured in their Bordeaux
cellars before being shipped. However, the difficulties of the major Me´doc
growers following the mildew years of 1882=6 saw the ne´gociants strengthen
their position significantly. In particular, the continual financial difficulties
of the leading growers led many of them in 1907 and 1908 to enter into
price agreements (abonnements) for five or more harvests with individual
shippers, selling their wine at a low, but guaranteed, price.49 Backward
integration through the purchase of a chaˆteau by the ne´gociants (or their
families) also increased in these years.
The measurement of trade by volume disguises the real significance of
market change, as it was the British demand for small quantities of very
fine wines that had produced the prosperity from the 1860s to the early
1880s. Another problem is that although French trade statistics show
wine exported in bottles from the Gironde, unknown quantities of
high-quality, young wines were also exported in barrels to be bottled
at their destination. As red wine production from the leading growers
almost doubled in the five-year period immediately before the outbreak
47 Ibid., 11 Sept. 1897.
48 ‘English habits. . .have undergone a considerable change during the past 30 years, and the after-
dinner half-hour is now monopolized by coffee and tobacco, while Britons have not yet accustomed
themselves to serve fine claret or burgundy with roast meat or game’: Letter from Gilbey to The Times,
29 Sept. 1896.
49 Most of the leading growers (Ch. Lafite, Latour, Margaux, Haut-Brion, Mouton-Rothschild, and
others) were involved: Cocks and Feret, Bordeaux et ses vins, 8th edn., pp. xviii-xxii.
of mildew and the turn of the twentieth century, exports of all bottled
wines from Bordeaux fell by more than 50 per cent (table 2). Elsewhere
the problems regarding reputation, together with rising tariffs, were also
responsible for weakening demand, so that the British market in 1900=4
remained larger than that of the rest of Europe and North America
combined. Sales of bottled claret to Sweden fell by 86 per cent, to Ger-
many by 43 per cent, to the Netherlands by 42 per cent, to North Amer-
ica by 26 per cent, and only Belgium saw an increase, by 38 per cent.50
However the weakness of this source is apparent from the inclusion of
both Latin American and French colonial markets, which in general
imported cheaper wines than those sold in Europe. Instead of being
caused by difficulties with reputation, the decline in sales to Latin Amer-
ica can be attributed to a combination of growing national production
and rising tariffs.51 Tariffs were obviously not a factor in France’s
colonial markets, and by 1900=4 Senegal had established itself as the
third largest market for bottled claret, after Britain and the United
States.52
Table 2. Indicators of Bordeaux’s quality wine production and exports
1877=1881 1900=1904 % change
Production 39,375 76,932 þ95
Exports
Total exports 100,861 44,606 56
Of which
Britain 47,210 17,724 62
All other markets 53,651 26,882 50
Other European markets 13,486 10,230 24
Non-European markets
Of which
40,165 16,652 59
Latin America 21,478 2,695 87
North America 6,254 4,528 28
French colonies 6,229
Dutch Indies 4,551
British India 1,630
Other countries 6,252 3,200
Notes: Quantities in hectolitres. Production is red wine from the leading growers (grands crus) of the Me´doc (Chaˆteau
Haut-Brion is excluded owing to the absence of output figures for 1877=81). Exports include all wine in bottles.
Sources: Cocks and Feret, Bordeaux et ses vins, 7th edn., pp. 104-5 and 8th edn., pp. 90-1; Direction Ge´ne´rale des
Douanes, Tableau Ge´ne´ral du commerce, various years.
50 I include those years when no figures are given (Germany 1881, Canada 1880, 1901, and 1902,
and Sweden, 1904), even though some exports are probably included in ‘all other countries’ for these
years. By excluding these years, the decline in imports is in Germany, 55%, in North America,
23%, and in Sweden, 82%.
51 Salavert, Le commerce des vins, pp. 187-8. For tariffs, Cocks and Feret, Bordeaux et ses vins, 8th edn.,
pp. 1051-64.
52 Export to Senegal averaged 3.7 million hectolitres in 1900=4, against 17.7 million to Britain, and
4.1 million to the United States.
The cause of the market loss for the cheaper Bordeaux wines was slightly
different. Domestic wine shortages led to prices increasing in France by
one-third from the early 1870s to the early 1880s, and the rise would have
been even greater if it had not been for the high level of imports, and the
‘manufacture’ of wines.53 In response to the smaller harvests, Bordeaux
merchants tried to keep prices low by mixing with inferior, imported wines.
By the mid-1880s Bordeaux was itself importing more wine than it was
exporting, leading the British consul to note that ‘it is probable that about
50 per cent of all wines shipped from here last year to British ports in wood
were ‘‘vins de cargaison’’ ’.54 The British press went a step further. Accord-
ing to The Telegraph,
An immense proportion of the Wine sold in England as Claret has nothing to do with
the banks of the Garonne, save that harsh heavy vintages have been brought from
Spain and Italy, and dried currants from Greece, there to be manipulated and
re shipped to England and the rest of the World as Lafite, Larose, St. Julien, and
St. Estephe.55
Although it seems unlikely that wines of the 1855 Classification actually
suffered this fate, the frequent newspaper references to the supposed mixing
with foreign wines or—even worse—adulteration, undermined claret’s
reputation, just as had happened earlier for sherry. Despite the fact that
the French wine market switched from shortage to over-production in the
early twentieth century, imports to Britain continued to fall. Once more this
can be explained by adulteration, but this time by ‘basis wines’, which were
manufactured in Britain from imported grape must and other substances,
and then mixed with imported French wines. According to Ridley’s, ‘people
drink so called ‘‘Claret’’, composed of one-third of the genuine article and
two-thirds of the British imposition, and condemn, not the latter, but
Claret’.56
It could be argued that Bordeaux’s merchants were making a necessary
business decision when they looked elsewhere for wines because of the high
prices and poor quality of local wine. Nevertheless, this was not how local
growers viewed the problem, especially as many were suffering in the 1880s
and 1890s from the heavy costs associated not only with downy mildew, but
also with replanting their vines after phylloxera. They lobbied the govern-
ment, and in 1899 the free ports were closed, making it prohibitively
expensive to import foreign wines for blending purposes.57 In France, the
53 Imports increased from the equivalent of less than 1% of production in the early 1870s, to one-
third in the 1880s. In 1891, domestic production was 30 million hectolitres, imports came to 12 million
and exports to just 2 million: Direction Ge´ne´rale, Annuaire statistique, pp. 63, 179-80.
54 P.P., Consular report, Bordeaux, 1889, no. 501, p. 9. For trade, see Roudie´, Vignobles et vignerons,
p. 180.
55 Cited in Ridley’s, July 1887, p. 315.
56 Ibid., April 1906, p. 338.
57 French tariffs on imported wine for domestic consumption were raised significantly in 1892,
but no duty was paid if it was for re-exporting: Gallinato-Contino, ‘Les entrepoˆts spe´ciaux’; Roudie´,
Vignobles et vignerons, pp. 211-12.
unprecedented amount of scientific research generated by the attempts to
combat vine diseases provided growers with the means to improve grape
yields, which rose from 21 hectolitres per hectare in the 1860s to 33
hectolitres in the 1900s, although at the cost of poorer quality wines.58
As prices continued to fall during the first decade of the twentieth century,
growers now lobbied to restrict the use of the name ‘Bordeaux’ to only
those wines produced in the Gironde. The framework for the creation of
a regional delimitation was provided by the 1905 law, although it was only
in 1911 that boundaries were established, and only after the First World
War that the administrative machinery was in place to enforce it. However,
even a well-functioning regional appellation was no guarantee of quality. If
it successfully raised prices by excluding poor-quality wines produced out-
side the region, this simply provided an incentive to produce more locally.
Only with the introduction from the mid-1930s of the appellation d’origine
contro^le´e, which controlled the nature of grape and wine production, could
consumers be guaranteed at least a minimum quality standard from
‘Bordeaux’.
Champagne was already an important drink by the eighteenth century,
but the region’s proximity to Paris had the consequence that it produced
much greater quantities of red wine until the 1850s, when it began to face
fierce competition from the Midi. From the late 1840s to the 1900s total
champagne sales increased almost five times, from 7 million bottles a year
to 32 million.59 Grapes which had previously been used for table wines
were switched to champagne, but technological change in wine making
was also important in increasing output. In 1837 Andre´ Franc¸ois discov-
ered how growers could measure the exact amount of sugar that needed
to be added each year to obtain a correct fermentation. Until this date large
quantities of wine often failed to become effervescent, or alternatively the
pressure became so great that ‘an enormous proportion of bottles would
burst’.60 Advances in glass-making techniques allowed stronger bottles to
be produced, reducing the loss from bottle breakage from about 25 per cent
in the late 1850s to 10 per cent by the 1870s.61
Most of the vineyards in the Champagne region were small, family con-
cerns, and the growers sold their grapes to firms that possessed the capital
and skills to make the wine. As a sparkling wine, champagne could only be
sold in bottles, and it was the winemaking firms rather than those involved
58 Calculated from Direction Ge´ne´rale, Annuaire statistique, pp. 62-3. The methods include the use of
hybrid vines, the heavy use of artificial fertilizers, and light prunings.
59 The growth in trade was foreseen by Maizie`re in 1848, when he noted that ‘sparkling wines have
made fortunes for twenty merchants, ensure an honest living for a hundred more, and provide a prompt
and profitable outlet for the product of every class of grower; yet the present state of the trade, already
ten times as lucrative as the old, is only in its infancy and can multiply tenfold within a few generations’:
cited in Faith, Story of champagne, pp. 55, 209.
60 Simon, Champagne trade, p. 100. See also Paul, Science, vine, and wine, ch. 7.
61 Guy, When champagne became French, p. 70.
in retailing that were best placed to establish brand names.62 The changes
in taste in the British market in the late 1860s to dry champagne allowed
producers to establish ‘vintage’ wines similar to port, and thereby a system
of classification which made it easier for consumers to identify the best
wines.63 According to one authority, these changes helped to transform
wine retailing in Britain from one of ‘long credit and bad debts, limited
business and high profits’ to one of cash payments and higher turnover.64
Attempts by some British wine merchants to have their own names placed
on the bottles met with only limited success. Gilbey’s, for example, which
was by far the largest of the retailers, sold only producer branded cham-
pagne after 1882, although the Victoria Wine Company’s list of 1896 con-
tinued to include seven ‘house’ champagnes, as well as 23 producer
branded champagnes.65 Despite the opposition from the domestic wine
trade, there were merits to the producer brands, which even Ridley’s, the
mouthpiece of the wholesale trade, recognized: ‘the system of brands, what-
ever its faults may be, is supposed to act as a guarantee to the public, who
are content to pay a higher figure for a branded article, rather than incur the
risk of not obtaining it genuine if they dispense with the guarantee’.66
The champagne producers were therefore the most successful in estab-
lishing brand names, so much so that one writer noted in 1890 that ‘within
ten years we will no longer recognise the name of champagne, but only
those of Roederer, Planckaert, Bollinger, without any idea what the wines
will be made out of ’.67 If the commercial strength of these brands was so
strong, why did exports to Britain start to decline from around 1900? No
doubt the decline was partly caused by the combination of higher duties
for champagne after 1888, and rising prices because of supply shortages
caused by phylloxera. Andre´ Simon, writing in 1905, also suggests that
the novelty of drinking ‘vintage’ champagne had declined, as houses were
declaring a harvest to be ‘vintage’ more frequently ‘than in the past’.68
However it also seems likely that the decline in the sales of the best cham-
pagne was in part a result of commercial strategy, as producers recognized
that their leading wines could not attract a mass market if they were being
branded as a luxury product. Sales strategies were changed so that produ-
cers gained a larger share of the profits, and some began to charge hotels
and restaurants if they wanted to stock their particular brand. It was a strat-
egy which implied lower volumes, and made producers much more vulner-
able to changes in fashion, such as the growth in whisky drinking at the turn
of the century.
62 Once it leaves the Maison, champagne does not improve in the bottle.
63 Simon, Champagne trade, pp. 99, 137. This author notes that the taste for sweet champagne lasted
longer outside London. For example, the shipper George Goulet exported sweet champagne with 16%
liquor content to a merchant in Birmingham, but with only 2% to London.
64 Simon, Champagne trade, p. 137.
65 Faith, Story of champagne, p. 73; Briggs, Wine for sale, p. 83.
66 Ridley’s, Jan. 1884, p. 3.
67 Lamarre, cited in Faith, Story of champagne, p. 78.
68 Simon, Champagne trade, p. 147.
Yet the leading champagne brands probably accounted for only a rela-
tively small part of the British market in terms of volume. The rapid growth
everywhere in the demand for champagne, the limited area of suitable land,
and the appearance of phylloxera after 1890, led to an increase in the sales
of poor-quality wines. Fraud, which had been ‘a peripheral concern in the
1890s’, became ‘the central issue for producers of both ordinary and fine
wines at the turn of the century’.69 Champagne producers had been more
successful than other wine producers in defending their wines, and in
1889 they succeeded in getting a judgement that forbade producers from
other regions to use the words ‘champagne’ or ‘vins de champagne’ in
France. Implementation was more difficult, however. Furthermore, the
judgement failed to stop Champagne’s own producers buying wines from
other regions, mixing them with local wines, and then selling them as
‘champagne’, a practice which was especially widespread after the disas-
trous harvests between 1908 and 1910.70 Consumers could still find quality
champagne, but the demand for the cheaper brands declined rapidly in Brit-
ain after 1900. Growers once more looked to create a regulatory authority,
establishing a regional appellation in 1911 by restricting the production of
champagne to grapes produced in a number of clearly defined areas.
V
In terms of value, approximately 60 per cent of all food and drink con-
sumed in Britain was imported by 1914.71 This dependence on imports,
together with the rapid growth in population, especially in urban areas,
and the increase in real disposable incomes, encouraged new forms of mar-
ket organization, sometimes called the ‘retailing revolution’. Among these
changes were the increasing importance of brand names, advertising, and
the appearance of large multiple retail outlets. In particular, the growing
dependence of British consumers on world markets helped to change the
location of power along the commodity chain. For example, the import
of frozen meat reduced the need for skilled butchers but required guaran-
teed outlets for the ‘vast quantities of frozen and later chilled meat that were
pouring into the United Kingdom’.72 By 1910, a total of only 10 UK firms
had between them established a total of 3,684 branches,73 and it was these
69 Guy, When champagne became French, p. 119. However, Tovey noted in 1870 that ‘even at Epernay
and other places in Champagne it is well known that there are houses which use but little of the wine of
the district in the manufacture of their wines’: Tovey, Champagne, p. 19.
70 Although The Times reminded consumers of the large reserves of quality wines in the region, and
also of the good reputation of the leading brands, it also noted that the champagne vintage of 1908 ‘had
been the subject of so many irresponsible statements and misleading comments and conclusions in the
press’: The Times, 19 Nov. 1908, p. 9. See also Daily Telegraph, 28 Aug. and 3 Sep. 1903, cited in Guy,
When champagne became French, p. 124.
71 Turner, ‘Agricultural output’, pp. 224-5.
72 Jefferys, Retail trading in Britain, p. 190. Imports of meat increased from 10% of the total in 1870 to
37% in 1896: ibid., p. 182.
73 Ibid., p. 187.
firms that controlled product quality, established brands, and enjoyed scale
economies in marketing. Likewise with coffee, the growing economies of
scale in roasting and packaging (the latter especially after vacuum sealing
was invented in 1900) encouraged a concentration in the number of firms
in the consuming countries, where a growing share of the value was
added.74 Because demand conditions were more volatile than supply, the
commodity chain was market- rather than producer-led, and brands were
established in the importing rather than the exporting countries.75
In the first half of the nineteenth century, like many other traders, the
British wine merchant was skilled,76 having to be able to select suitable
wines, blend them to the tastes of a particular consumer, and stop them
from spoiling. Bottling was another skilled task, often undertaken on the cli-
ent’s premises. Retail wine merchants in general responded to the wants
and needs of high-income consumers.77 Lower duties and the ‘Single Bottle
Act’ of 1861 provided retailers with opportunities to package and market
wines in new ways. The Victoria Wine Company, which was established
in 1865 in Mark Lane in the City of London, had by 1886 some 98 stores
throughout the country.78 The company bottled its own wines, and placed
the fact that they were ‘unadulterated’ prominently in its advertisements.79
Gilbey’s was even more successful, being responsible in 1875 for 5 per cent
of all wine sold, six times the share of its nearest rival.80 Taking advantage
of the lower duties and especially the ‘Single Bottle Act’, it sold all its wine
in sealed and labelled bottles.81 The firm’s success was achieved by import-
ing wines in bulk directly from the country of origin, and by the use of its
‘Castle’ brand and of some 2,000 carefully monitored agents throughout
the country. These agents were often already well-established grocers,
and were stocked with a selection from Gilbey’s 200 different varieties
of drinks. Sales on this scale allowed the company to spend heavily on
advertising.
Yet the impressive results of these two companies were insufficient to halt
the decline in wine sales from the mid-1870s. A number of problems can be
identified. First, and according to Jefferys, large-scale retailers had few
advantages over smaller ones unless they could achieve buying and selling
economies, and introduce standardization and stock control.82 There were
few economies of scale in wine production, and therefore higher sales did
74 Over three-quarters of the retail price of coffee in the grocery trade was added in consuming coun-
tries by 1935: Topik, ‘Integration’, p. 60.
75 See especially Casson, Information and organization, pp. 28-9.
76 Jefferys, Retail trading in Britain, p. 2.
77 There was, of course, a market for poorer quality wines and the adulteration of wines prior to 1860
was also important: see especially Redding, Modern wine.
78 Briggs, Wine for sale, p. 9.
79 Illustrated London News, 13 Dec. 1873, cited in Briggs, Wine for sale, p. 48. By 1880 the company
was listing 16 sherries, together with 14 ports, 8 clarets, and ‘sundry wines’ including a Hambro sherry
(ibid., p. 53).
80 Faith, Victorian vineyard, p. 12.
81 S.C. on Wine Duties (P.P. 1878-9, XIV), p. 157.
82 Jefferys, Retail trading in Britain.
not lead to lower unit production costs.83 The fact that wine quality var-
ied greatly not just from one harvest to the next, but even on an individ-
ual vineyard in the same year, led to supply instability and high
information costs for importers. Gilbey’s, for example, depended on
leading shippers in Jerez and Porto to select its wines, although these
were sold under Gilbey’s own brand. When the firm purchased Chaˆteau
Loudenne in the Me´doc in 1875, it was an example of backward inte-
gration which appears to have been made as much to reduce information
costs in its search to buy suitable wines from local growers, as to cut
production costs.84 As an investment, the purchase of Chaˆteau Loud-
enne occurred at perhaps the worst moment possible and was a drain
on company resources, but it did allow Gilbey’s to market itself as a
wine producer. Another problem was that although the infrastructure
provided by the firm’s shops reduced the skills that the traditional wine
merchant required, in particular the blending of different wine, some
specialized knowledge was still needed and a common complaint was
that wines were badly stored by grocers.
Although Gladstone had hoped that the legislation of the early 1860s
would extend wine drinking to other social classes, the evidence suggests
that it had only limited success.85 In the early 1880s, a very rough estimate
by the British Association claimed that the working class purchased 75 per
cent of all beer and spirits, but consumed just 10 per cent of wine. Taking
annual per caput consumption at this time as two and a half bottles, this
implies that 75 per cent of the population on average drank only one-third
of a bottle, and the remainder consumed nine bottles.86 For the years 1913-
14, another survey shows that those with annual incomes of between £150
and £200 consumed four times more wine than those with between £50
and £100.87 Therefore, given that the middle- and upper-class consumers
appear to have continued to account for an important segment of the mar-
ket, it is possible that demand factors specific to these social groups were at
least partly responsible for the fact that per caput consumption of wine
declined more than that of either spirits or beer in the late nineteenth cen-
tury. Traditionally, considerable amounts of port, sherry, and claret had
been drunk in rural areas, and contemporaries noted in particular the
decline in demand with the onset of the agrarian crisis and the fall in rents
after 1873. However, although sherry imports actually peaked in that year,
83 For potential scale economies in grape and wine production, see Simpson, ‘Cooperation and
cooperatives’.
84 Gilbey’s first bought wines directly in France in 1863: Maxwell, Half-a-century, p. 18. For Chaˆteau
Loudenne, see especially, Faith, Victorian vineyard.
85 Gladstone’s interest in reducing wine duties appears to have derived from the belief that free trade
and sobriety went hand in hand: Harrison, Drink and the Victorians, p. 248. Not only did he expect wine
consumption and revenue to rise rapidly after the reduction in duties, but he also hoped to change the
social habits of drinkers.
86 The ‘working class’ is taken as 75%. Quoted in Rowntree and Sherwell, Temperance problem, p. 10,
my calculation.
87 Colwyn Report (P.P. 1927, XI), p. 92, cited in Burnett, Liquid pleasure, p. 142.
there were other factors present which help to provide an explanation.88
Port imports were also weak during the 1880s, but then recovered. Declin-
ing farm incomes probably reduced demand from this group of consumers,
but new potential markets were appearing in the rapidly growing urban cen-
tres. For example, rural consumers had traditionally purchased their port
and sherry in barrels, and bottled them on their own premises, but urban
consumers in general often had limited space for a wine cellar, and pre-
ferred to buy their wines already bottled.89 Likewise it was argued at the
turn of the century that brewers were entering into the wine trade, not just
supplying their publicans, but also purchasing wine merchants’ busi-
nesses.90 In other words, changes in real incomes and inequality helped
to alter the shape of demand, and this was just as likely to be beneficial
for the consumption of some types of wines as prejudicial for others. In
particular, it does not explain why urban consumers did not drink more,
or why multiple retail outlets were not as successful in marketing wine as
they were in marketing other foods and beverages.
VI
This article has tried to explain why the growth of the British wine market
which took place after the changes in duties and retailing laws in the early
1860s was limited. Imports grew quickly until the mid-1870s, but then
fell, and per caput consumption was no greater in 1913 than it had been
in 1815, despite the retail price of the cheapest wines being one-fifth of
those in Wellington’s time. Why were markets which had been gained
after 1860 subsequently lost? This article has argued that producers and
shippers had limited success in classifying and guaranteeing the quality
of their wines for a changing market. In Jerez the solera system was an ad-
mirable method of blending wines and maintaining quality, but provided
consumers with too little information about the nature of the wine, es-
pecially in a period when widespread adulteration was taking place. By
contrast, the 1855 Bordeaux Classification provided good information
on the relative merits of the leading claret producers, but the crucial infor-
mation on the vintage was missing. When vine diseases ruined wine qual-
ity in the 1880s, large quantities of ‘villainous trash’ were exported, and
wines were often marketed by emphasizing their ‘growth’, rather than
the ‘vintage’. With both sherry and claret it seems that, as Akerlof
predicted, the presence of poor-quality wines had a negative impact on
the market for better ones. In the case of sherry and cheap clarets, the
drop in quality was caused by poorer wines from other regions or
88 Sherry imports peaked in 1873, in part because of the rumours that duties were to be raised: Pan-
Montojo, La Bodega del Mundo, p. 106. Thudichum’s infamous letter to The Times was published in the
same year.
89 Ridley’s, April 1903, p. 241, Sept. 1904, p. 639, and Sept. 1899, p. 621.
90 See, for example, Ridley’s, Sept. 1899, p. 622 and Jan. 1900, p. 8.
‘manufactured wines’ being wrongly labelled, but with quality claret it was
the consequence of a run of exceptionally poor harvests. In this case, large
quantities of poor-quality wines from the leading producers were
exported, ruining their reputation, with the result that although they were
producing more wine than at any time during the period under dis-
cussion, the value of their properties was at its lowest.91 By contrast, both
champagne and port producers were more successful in protecting their
brands than claret producers. Consumers could classify the relative status
of a champagne or port by the reputation of the producer=shipper and the
quality of the vintage. More important perhaps, there were clearly defined
uses for both these wines after the poorer harvests, and these uses did not
have a detrimental impact on the quality market. Port shippers were less
likely than sherry shippers to ship poor-quality wines, and the leading
champagne shippers were the most successful of all, both in creating
brands and in protecting their regional identity.
Given the difficulties in establishing objective measures of quality for con-
sumers, the incentive for shippers, especially those who did not have to
maintain a reputation for quality wines, was to export large quantities of
cheap wines. Ridley’s naturally argued that a more efficient guarantee of
quality for consumers was provided by the reputation of British wine mer-
chants. As with an increasing number of other foods and beverages by the
late nineteenth century, this implies that commodity chains would be ‘mar-
ket’- rather than ‘production’-led, and importers would be responsible for
classifying and controlling wine quality. They could avoid a poor vintage
in a particular region, but make large purchases after good vintages. In
other words they could perform, on a larger geographical scale and in the
United Kingdom, the sort of operations for which the Bordeaux ne´gociant
had traditionally been responsible. This was partly why Gilbey’s was
initially successful. However, the scale required in co-ordinating purchases
from different centres of wine production was considerable, and to develop
a brand name as successful as Gilbey’s required a considerable capital outlay.
In fact, Gilbey’s was probably unique in Europe at this time, and the Brit-
ish wine market differed significantly from that of other countries in many
ways. Virtually all quality sherry and port was sold to this market and,
despite the problems discussed in this article, the British market remained
the largest for bottled claret in the early twentieth century.92 Only with
champagne did other markets of any size exist. However, although compar-
isons with other countries regarding quality wine have only limited value,
their experience with ordinary wines is relevant. It is difficult to establish
long-run price series because of the question of quality, yet the presence
of vine diseases, especially from the late 1870s and 1880s, drove prices
sharply up throughout Europe. The production of artificial wines and the
practice of adulteration was at least as widespread in producer countries
91 For real estate prices, see Pijassou, Le Me´doc, and Caziot, Le valeur de la terre.
92 Britain accounted for about one-fifth of Bordeaux’s exports in bottles in 1909=11.
as in Britain.93 Per caput wine consumption also declined in France from
the 1870s, from an average of 145 litres per person in 1869-78 to 98 litres
in 1883-92. The fact that wine in France and Spain was the alcoholic bev-
erage of first choice implies that the combination of high prices and adulter-
ation caused only a temporary decline in consumption. The recovery in
supplies from the 1890s brought about a revival of wine drinking, and by
the 1900s annual consumption had reached over 150 litres per person in
France. In Britain, by contrast, the market for cheap wines was still very
limited when it peaked in the early 1870s, and in the face of higher prices
and falling quality, consumers turned to other alcoholic and non-alcoholic
drinks. Therefore although per caput beer consumption also declined
slightly in the late nineteenth century, not only was beer cheaper than wine,
it was also probably purer.94 No doubt many of the claims concerning the
adulteration of Spanish ‘white’ and Bordeaux ‘red’ were exaggerated, but
there was little or no attempt from Jerez or Bordeaux to respond to the
charges.
This brings us to a final point, namely the contribution of wine exports to
productivity changes in agriculture and, more generally, to economic devel-
opment. The vine was traditionally grown over large areas of Europe, with
the high labour inputs and skills required making it an ideal crop for small
family farms. With the coming of the railways and the integration of
national commodity markets in the mid-nineteenth century there was an in-
crease in regional specialization even before phylloxera.95 New high-yield-
ing hybrids allowed growers to increase output, and by the turn of the
century there was over-production in France. The high prices of ordinary
wines in the 1870s and 1880s also encouraged an expansion of viticulture,
not just in the French colony of Algeria but also in countries such as Argen-
tina or Australia which had previously been dependent on Europe for
imports. Unfortunately for European producers, by the first decade of the
twentieth century little more than 10 per cent of wine produced was traded
internationally and European countries themselves imported approximately
80 per cent of the total. In particular, France was responsible for half the
world’s imports in 1909=13, and the figure increased over the next couple
of decades to reach 80 per cent by 1934=8.96 There were two reasons why
producers found it so difficult to establish new overseas markets. The first
93 In Spain in the late 1880s it was estimated that about one-quarter of the wines were manufactured
using foreign alcohol as a base: see Simpson, Spanish agriculture, p. 97.
94 Gourvish and Wilson, British brewing industry, p. 208, suggests that ‘dilution and adulteration, the
old resort of distressed publicans, seem to have been increasingly stamped out after the mid-1880s, as
analysis became common, and brewers fought long and hard to remove the practice of the ‘‘long pull’’.’
Beer prices remained stable in the second half of the nineteenth century at between 3.5d. and 6d. a
quart: ibid., p. 207.
95 For example, France’s south west and south east increased their share of the national wine market
from 42% in 1803=41 to 42% in 1852, and to 65% in 1900=9: Lachiver, Vins, vignes et vignerons,
pp. 617-18.
96 Calculated from Pinilla and Ayuda, ‘Political economy’, tab. 2. A large proportion of the wine came
from Algeria to be mixed with the wines of the Midi, and then sold in the cities of northern France.
was that imports attracted relatively high levels of duty, with the consequence
that the movements of wines between countries were strongly influenced by
changes in the prevailing level of duties.97 The second factor is the subject
of this article, namely the question of quality. In producer countries such
as France, the better table wines enjoyed only a modest premium, and
the incentives for the vast majority of producers therefore were to maximize
output.98
In the half century prior to 1914, the failure of producer-led commodity
chains to establish both a reputation for purity and an efficient system for
consumers to measure quality, led to the decline in reputation of wines in
the British market. The interwar period in general was not a good time
for quality wines, and the British market, in particular, was depressed.
For table wines, the return to a policy of Imperial Preference for the
Dominion wines in 1919, which had been abolished in 1860, helped to
reduce imports from France to less than 20 per cent of the total, or just
40 per cent of the figure reached when imports peaked in 1876. Only from
the 1950s, when the controlled appellations began to guarantee minimum
quality, tourists started to visit mainland Europe in significant numbers,
and supermarkets stocked wines in large quantities, did the British learn
to enjoy Europe’s wines once more.
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97 For the impact of tariffs on the structure of the international wine market, see especially Simpson,
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98 See, for example, the important contribution by Auge´-Laribe´, Le proble`me agraire, especially p. 165.
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